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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
         In this appeal Robert McQuilkin challenges his 
sentence.  We will affirm. 
                               I. 
         Between March 1994 and July 1994, Robert McQuilkin sold 
methamphetamine.  All sales took place within 1,000 feet of St. 
Francis Xavier, a parochial elementary school in Philadelphia. 
         A jury found McQuilkin guilty of conspiracy to distribute 
methamphetamine (21 U.S.C. § 846); distribution of methamphetamine 
(21 U.S.C. § 841(a)); distribution of methamphetamine within 1,000 
feet of a school (21 U.S.C. § 860); and use of a communication 
facility in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (21 U.S.C. § 
843(b)). 
         The district court determined that McQuilkin was a 
"career offender" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, which raised his criminal 
history from Category III to Category IV and his offense level to 
thirty-seven.  The applicable guideline range was 360 months to 
life.  The district court sentenced McQuilkin to 360 months 
imprisonment on §§ 846, 841(a) and 860 and 48 months on § 843(b), 
to run concurrently. 
         On appeal, McQuilkin contends he did not qualify as a 
"career offender."  Alternatively, he argues a downward departure 
was warranted because the "career offender" designation overstated 
his criminal history and he suffered from a "severe medical 
impairment." 
                              II. 
                               A. 
         To qualify as a "career offender" under § 4B1.1 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant must have at least two prior 
felony convictions of either "crimes of violence" or controlled 
substance offenses.  McQuilkin does not challenge the propriety of 
counting his 1987 drug trafficking conviction as a predicate 
offense.  What is in dispute is whether McQuilkin's 1988 conviction 
for aggravated assault is a "crime of violence," and thereby 
constitutes the second predicate offense required for "career 
offender" status.  While under the influence of alcohol and drugs, 
McQuilkin crashed a motorcycle, severely injuring himself and his 
passenger.  As a result, he was convicted of aggravated assault (18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702 (1995)) for injuring his passenger.  
The district court considered the aggravated assault conviction a 
"crime of violence" and counted it as the second predicate offense.  
But McQuilkin contends that "mere recklessness" should not 
constitute a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.1. 
         "Crime of violence" is defined in § 4B1.2 of the 
guidelines: 
    The term `crime of violence' means any offense under 
    federal or state law punishable by imprisonment for a 
    term exceeding one year that -- 
         (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, 
         or threatened use of physical force against 
         the person of another, or 
         (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
         extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
         otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
         serious risk of physical injury to another 
 
U.S.S.G., § 4B1.2.  Application Note 2 to § 4B1.2 states that the 
term "`[c]rime of violence' includes . . . aggravated assault."  
The government maintains Application Note 2 definitively 
establishes that McQuilkin's conviction for aggravated assault 
qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2, and a predicate 
offense under the "career offender" provision. 
         McQuilkin contends the conduct underlying his conviction 
was not the type contemplated by Congress when it enacted 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994, or by the Sentencing Commission when it promulgated Section 
4B1.2.  He asserts his conviction for aggravated assault from the 
motorcycle accident was based on a finding of "mere recklessness," 
and notwithstanding Application Note 2's reference to "aggravated 
assaults" as a class or generic category, should not qualify as a  
"crime of violence." 
         To support his argument, McQuilkin invokes the last 
sentence of Application Note 2's first paragraph which provides: 
"[u]nder this section, the conduct of which the defendant was 
convicted is the focus of the inquiry."  U.S.S.G., § 4B1.2, 
comment. (n.2).  This sentence was added to Application Note 2 as 
Amendment 433 to the Sentencing Guidelines, and became effective 
November 1, 1991.  Amendment 433, U.S.S.G. App. C, at 312 (1995).  
McQuilkin maintains this directive requires a court to look beyond 
the offense categories listed in the Application Note and evaluate 
the underlying conduct to determine whether the defendant committed 
a "crime of violence." 
                               B. 
         Construction of the guidelines is subject to plenary 
review, while factual determinations underlying guideline 
application are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard.  SeeUnited 
States v. Sokolow, 91 F.3d 396, 411 (3d Cir. 1996).  The 
proper construction of the term "crime of violence" is a question 
of law, and our review is plenary.  United States v. Parson, 955 
F.2d 858, 863 (3d Cir. 1992). 
         As we have previously noted, the relevant Pennsylvania 
statute defines aggravated assault as one who "attempts to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life . . . 
." 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2702 (1995).  McQuilkin contends his 
aggravated assault conviction was predicated upon a determination 
that his conduct was reckless.  The government has not contradicted 
McQuilkin's characterization of his offense.  Although the record 
of the aggravated assault conviction is inconclusive, it does 
appear that McQuilkin's conviction was based on a finding of 
recklessness.   
         Our jurisprudence, however, does not permit us to examine 
the actual conduct underlying the offense, notwithstanding the 
Sentencing Commission's instruction that "the conduct of which the 
defendant was convicted is the focus of the inquiry."  U.S.S.G. § 
4B1.2, Comment. (n.2).  To demonstrate why this is so, we will 
undertake a brief review of our case law and Amendment 433. 
         Before Amendment 433 was adopted, we held that when 
considering crimes specifically enumerated in the guidelines or 
application notes, the sentencing judge may not consider the 
underlying conduct.  See Parson, 955 F.2d at 872; United States v. 
John, 936 F.2d 764, 767-78 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. 
McAllister, 927 F.2d 136, 139 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 833 
(1991).  As for crimes not specifically enumerated, the Courts of 
Appeals disagreed over whether the "crime of violence" designation 
turned on the facts of the underlying behavior, or on the statutory 
definition of the offense.  Compare John, 936 F.2d at 768 (courts 
may look to defendant's actual conduct); United States v. Goodman, 
914 F.2d 696, 699 (5th Cir. 1990) ("When the instant offense is not 
one of those enumerated, . . . [the] court is permitted to look 
beyond the face of the indictment and consider all facts disclosed 
by the record"); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 918 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (the court must look to the specific conduct of the 
defendant as well as the elements of the offense charged), cert. 
denied, 500 U.S. 934 (1991); with United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 
911 F.2d 542, 547 (11th Cir. 1990) (a court may only review the 
statutory definition of the crime or the generic category of the 
offense, and not the defendant's actual conduct), cert. denied, 500 
U.S. 933 (1991); United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 570 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (courts may only look to statutory definition of 
offense), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991).   
         Through Amendment 433, the Sentencing Commission sought 
to clarify the "crime of violence" designation to include only the 
"conduct of which the defendant was convicted."  Sentencing judges 
were directed not to examine the actual underlying behavior when 
conducting the "career offender" analysis.  Amendment 433, U.S.S.G. 
App. C, at 312 (1995); Joshua, 976 F.2d at 856 ("[A] sentencing 
court should look solely to the conduct alleged in the count of the 
indictment charging the offense of conviction in order to determine 
whether the offense is a crime of violence . . ."); United States 
v. Fitzhugh, 954 F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[t]he sentencing 
court should consider conduct expressly charged in the count of 
which the defendant was convicted, but not any other conduct that 
might be associated with the offense"). 
         Nevertheless, this clarification is inconsequential to 
our analysis for specifically enumerated crimes.  In a recent 
decision, which post-dates the adoption of Amendment 433, we held 
that no inquiry into the facts of the predicate offense is 
permitted when a predicate conviction is enumerated as a "crime of 
violence" in Application Note 2 to § 4B1.2.  United States v. 
McClenton, 53 F.3d 584 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 
S.Ct. 330, 133 L.Ed.2d 230 (1995).  The fact of conviction remains 
dispositive for such crimes.   
         In McClenton we were asked to decide whether a hotel 
guest room constituted a "dwelling," thereby making burglary of a 
hotel room a "crime of violence" under § 4B1.2.  The hotel room was 
unoccupied at the time of the burglary and the defendant argued 
that his crime was against property, not habitation, and therefore 
should not be considered a "crime of violence."  We found 
otherwise, concluding the guidelines did not support a distinction 
between inhabited and uninhabited dwellings.  In explaining our 
decision we wrote, "the only issue we must decide is whether the 
prior convictions for burglary involved a dwelling.  Because 
burglary of a dwelling is specifically enumerated in the 
Guidelines, no further inquiry is warranted."  McClenton, 53 F.3d 
at 588. 
         Because the Sentencing Commission has adopted a 
categorical approach to the determination of whether an underlying 
offense is a "crime of violence," we reaffirmed in McClenton our 
earlier judgment that "where the predicate offense is expressly 
listed as a crime of violence, a more detailed inquiry into the 
underlying facts is inappropriate".  McClenton, 53 F.3d at 588.   
         Arguably, one can read the Commission's instruction that 
the "conduct of which the defendant was convicted is the focus of 
inquiry" as referring only to § 4B1.2(1)(ii) -- to "conduct that 
presents a serious risk of physical injury to another."  But we 
need not reach this question, for whatever uncertainty lingers over 
the meaning and scope of Amendment 433 (when, and to what extent, 
a court can look to the offense of conviction's facts in assessing 
"crime of violence" status), we have determined that no inquiry 
into the facts is permitted when a predicate offense is enumerated 
as a "crime of violence" in Application Note 2 to § 4B1.2.  SeeMcClenton, 
53 F.3d at 584. 
         In the past we have expressed misgivings about including 
"pure recklessness" offenses within the "crime of violence" 
category.  In Parson, a pre-Amendment 433 case, we "urge[d] that 
the Commission reconsider its career offender Guidelines to the 
extent that they cover . . . `pure recklessness' crimes."  Parson, 
955 F.2d at 874 (noting displeasure with the Commission's broad 
definition of "crime of violence" which included possible 
unintentional uses of force when the original congressional 
definition excluded such crimes).  Since there has been no change 
in the "crime of violence" definition, "purely reckless" crimes 
continue to count as predicate offenses for purposes of "career 
offender" consideration.  Nevertheless, we renew our request to the 
Sentencing Commission to reexamine its position on the inclusion of 
"purely reckless" crimes as predicate offenses under the "career 
offender" sentencing provisions.  As currently written, a defendant 
could be considered a "career offender" and subjected to enhanced 
penalties on the basis of two prior convictions for reckless 
conduct. 
                              III. 
                               A. 
         Having concluded McQuilkin was appropriately sentenced as 
a "career offender," we will address his contention the district 
court erred in failing to depart below the applicable guidelines 
range.         
         McQuilkin contends that his designation as a "career 
offender" overstates his criminal history, and the district court 
should have departed downward.  To support his view, he cites 
United States v. Shoupe ("Shoupe III"), 35 F.3d 835, 836 (3d Cir. 
1994), where we held a sentencing court may depart downward on both 
a defendant's offense level and criminal history designation if the 
defendant's "criminal offender" status overstates his criminal 
history and likelihood of recidivism.  The Shoupe decision was 
grounded in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, a policy statement which provides: 
"[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history 
category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the 
defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the 
defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing 
a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guidelines 
range."  Although McQuilkin does not rely directly on § 4A1.3, he 
generally argues for a departure on the same basis as that set 
forth in § 4A1.3's policy statement. 
         We lack jurisdiction to review a refusal to depart 
downward when the district court, knowing it may do so, nonetheless 
determines that departure is not warranted.  See United States v. 
Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 1989) ("To the extent this 
appeal attacks the district court's exercise of discretion in 
refusing to reduce the sentences below the sentencing guidelines, 
it will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); 
United States v. Georgiadis, 933 F.2d 1219, 1222 (3d Cir. 1991) 
("we have jurisdiction to decide whether a sentencing court erred 
legally when not making a requested departure, but we cannot hear 
a challenge to the merits of a sentencing court's discretionary 
decision not to depart downward from the Guidelines"); United 
States v. Evans, 49 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[a] 
discretionary decision by the trial judge that a departure is not 
justified is not reviewable"). 
         Here, the district court neither misunderstood nor 
misapplied the law in evaluating McQuilkin's downward departure 
request for "overstatement of criminal history."  While the 
district court did not explain its rationale for declining to 
exercise its discretion to depart under § 4A1.3, the court 
explicitly stated "I am satisfied in my mind, among other reasons, 
that the guidelines are necessary because I believe that really you 
need to be institutionalized because I believe not only you are a 
danger to yourself, but in fact you have proven to be a danger to 
other people."  This statement reinforces what the court's actions 
conveyed; its view that McQuilkin's criminal history designation 
did not overstate his past criminal conduct or the likelihood he 
would commit future crimes.  Because there is no allegation the 
district court misapprehended the law in reviewing McQuilkin's 
request for departure, we have no authority to review its valid 
exercise of discretion. 
                               B. 
         McQuilkin also argues for departure based on his physical 
condition.  As a result of his motorcycle accident, McQuilkin 
suffered injuries to his left arm.  He also has a congenital defect 
in his left eye, affecting the eye muscle.  McQuilkin contends 
these "handicaps" constitute a "severe medical impairment," and the 
district court should have departed downward in light of his 
condition. 
         Section 5H1.4 of the sentencing guidelines provides that 
although physical condition or appearance is not ordinarily 
relevant in sentencing, "an extraordinary physical impairment may 
be reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline 
range."  McQuilkin seizes on this language, claiming he suffers 
from an "extraordinary physical impairment," which would place him 
at risk for improper medical treatment in prison and make him a 
target of other prison inmates.   
         At sentencing, the district court found McQuilkin's 
condition was "not that type of an impairment so severe and 
complete that the downward departure [was] . . . warranted."  The 
court's determination that McQuilkin did not have the kind of 
impairment described in §5H1.4 which "warrants" a departure could 
have meant one of two things: that McQuilkin's impairment was not 
extraordinary enough to allow the court to depart under the 
authority of § 5H1.4; or that the nature of the impairment was 
sufficiently extraordinary to allow the court to depart, but that 
the court elected not to depart on this occasion.  We believe the 
court meant the former, in which case, we review this finding for 
clear error.  There is no clear error here.  If the court meant the 
latter, it would be unreviewable as a refusal to exercise 
discretion.  See Denardi, 892 F.2d 269.  Either way, McQuilkin's 
contention the court erred in refusing to depart on the basis of 
his physical condition lacks merit. 
                              IV. 
                               A. 
         The final issue is whether the district court used the 
correct "offense statutory maximum" to calculate McQuilkin's 
offense level under § 4B1.1.  Section 4B1.1 contains a table which 
determines a defendant's offense level based on the maximum 
sentence authorized by statute for an offense.  "If the offense 
level for a career criminal offender from the table . . . is 
greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the offense 
level from the table . . . shall apply."  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  The 
table offense level is combined with the criminal history status of 
a "career offender" (always Category VI) to arrive at the sentence 
for that "career offender." 
         The offense level for a "career offender" depends on the 
statutory maximum term of imprisonment, which in the case of drug 
offenses depends on the type and quantity of drugs involved.  The 
district court found McQuilkin was responsible for more than 100 
grams of methamphetamine.  Because McQuilkin had a prior 
conviction for a felony drug offense, the maximum statutory penalty 
he faced was life imprisonment; if he had not previously been 
convicted of a drug felony, the maximum penalty for his offense 
would have been forty years. 
         The district court used life imprisonment as the maximum 
statutory penalty to determine McQuilkin's offense level under § 
4B1.1's table for career offenders, and concluded his offense level 
was 37.  But Application Note 2 to § 4B1.1 directs the sentencing 
court to ignore any increases in the offense statutory maximum 
based on the defendant's prior criminal record.  McQuilkin 
contends that by using life rather than 40 years to determine the 
appropriate offense level under § 4B1.1, the district court erred 
and imposed a longer sentence than the law permits.  He suggests 
his offense level under § 4B1.1 should have been 34, resulting in 
a sentencing range of 262-327 months. 
         The government contends Application Note 2's instruction 
to ignore any increases in the offense statutory maximum based on 
the defendant's prior criminal record is invalid, because it is 
inconsistent with a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 994(h).  McQuilkin 
argues the Application Note does not conflict with § 994(h). 
                               B. 
         The validity of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1's Application Note 2 is 
a matter that has vexed several sister Courts of Appeals, yielding 
opposing views.  United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946 (8th Cir. 
1996) (finding Note invalid); United States v. Hernandez, 79 F.3d 
584 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 
2627 (U.S. June 17, 1996) (No. 95-9335); United States v. Novey, 78 
F.3d 1483 (10th Cir. 1996) (same), petition for cert. filed, 64 
U.S.L.W. 2627 (U.S. April 29, 1996) (No. 95-8791); but see United 
States v. Dunn, 80 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding Note valid); 
United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396 (1st Cir. 1995) (same), 
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).  Even though the Supreme 
Court has decided to review the conflict, pending appeal, we 
nonetheless align ourselves with the Courts of Appeals for the 
Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which have found Application 
Note 2 and § 994(h) irreconcilable. 
                               C. 
         Commentary in the guidelines is binding unless it runs 
afoul of the Constitution or a federal statute, or is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the section of the guidelines it 
purports to interpret.  Stinson, 508 U.S. at 42-45.  We find 
Application Note 2 to § 4B1.1 invalid because it conflicts with the 
statutory mandate of § 994(h). 
         Forceful arguments discussing the validity of Application 
Note 2 have been advanced by the five Courts of Appeals that have 
already spoken.  We need not reinvent the wheel by repeating their 
exhaustive analyses.  It is sufficient to say we are convinced by 
the approach of the Seventh, Eighth, and especially, Tenth 
Circuits, and note the principal reasons for our agreement. 
         In Novey, 78 F.3d 1483, the Tenth Circuit turned first to 
the language in § 994(h), and found Application Note 2 inconsistent 
with the statute.  Id. at 1487.  Section 994(h) provides:  
    The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify 
    a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the 
    maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in 
    which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and -- 
         (1) had been convicted of a felony that is -- 
              (A) a crime of violence; or  
              (B) an offense described in section 
              401 of the Controlled Substances Act 
              (21 U.S.C. § 841), sections 1002(a), 
              1005 and 1009 of the Controlled 
              Substances Import and Export Act (21 
              U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 955, and 959), and 
              the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
              Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 1901 et seq.); 
              and 
         (2) has previously been convicted of two or 
         more prior felonies, each of which is -- 
              (A) a crime of violence; or  
              (B) an offense described in section 
              401 of the Controlled Substances Act 
              (21 U.S.C. § 841), sections 1002(a), 
              1005 and 1009 of the Controlled 
              Substances Import and Export Act (21 
              U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 955, and 959), and 
              the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
              Act (46 U.S.C.App. § 1901 et seq.). 
28 U.S.C. § 994(h).  The court concluded the phrase "maximum term 
authorized" could only be interpreted to mean "maximum enhanced 
term authorized."  It explained, "[b]ecause the `maximum term 
authorized' for categories of defendants in which the defendant has 
two prior qualifying felony convictions is necessarily the enhanced 
statutory maximum, we find no ambiguity in the statute.  It would 
make no sense for the statute to require the `maximum term 
authorized' to be considered in the context of defendants with two 
or more prior qualifying felony convictions unless it was intended 
that phrase mean the enhanced sentence resulting from the pattern 
of recidivism."  Id.; see also Fountain, 83 F.3d at 952 ("There is 
no ambiguity in the directive contained in section 994(h).").  We 
find this analysis convincing. 
         We also agree with the Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits 
that reading Application Note 2's use of the term "maximum" to 
refer to unenhanced sentences "relegates the enhanced penalties 
Congress provided for in [statutes like 21 U.S.C § 841] . . . to 
the dust bin."  Hernandez, 79 F.3d at 595; see also Fountain, 83 
F.3d at 953; Novey, 78 F.3d at 1488; LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1415 
(Stahl, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Such an 
interpretation strains credulity, and would undermine Congress' 
clear intent in § 994(h) to augment rather than scale back the 
sentences of qualifying recidivist offenders. 
         Finally, we concur with the Tenth Circuit's overview of 
the statute.  "Section 994(h) does not mandate that each individual 
defendant receive a sentence `at or near the maximum term 
authorized.'  Rather, the statute directs the Commission to assure 
that the guidelines specify such a term `for categories of 
defendants' in which the defendant is a recidivist violent felon or 
drug offender.  Sentence adjustments based on the circumstances of 
an individual defendant, such as acceptance of responsibility, 
substantial assistance to the investigation, or any other 
mitigating factor, are not implicated."  Novey, 78 F.3d at 1489-90 
(footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).  In light of our 
understanding of § 994(h), the First Circuit's view that it is 
difficult for the Commission to ensure "that career offenders will 
invariably receive sentences `at or near' each individual's" 
enhanced sentence maximum is not convincing.  Such a rationale 
cannot support the notion that Application Note 2 rests on a 
permissible Commission interpretation of the statute.  LaBonte, 70 
F.3d at 1409-10 ("[T]he phrase `at or near,' as employed in this 
statute, suggests a continuum of sentences, each relatively further 
from, or closer to, the statutory maximum").  Given the clear 
language of § 994(h), and its apparent tension with a proliferating 
scheme of statutory sentence enhancement provisions based on past 
criminal conduct, we believe Application Note 2 is fatally 
inconsistent with § 994(h).  
                               V. 
         For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment of 
sentence imposed by the district court. 
 
